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            International Evidence on the Determinants of Organisational Ethical Vulnerability 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a model to explain what makes organisations ethically vulnerable. 
Drawing upon legitimacy, institutional, agency and individual moral reasoning theories 
we consider three sets of explanatory factors and examine their association with 
organisational ethical vulnerability. The three sets comprise external institutional 
context, internal corporate governance mechanisms and organisational ethical 
infrastructure. We combine these three sets of factors and develop an analytical 
framework for classifying ethical issues and propose a new model of organisational 
ethical vulnerability. We test our model on a sample of 253 firms that were involved 
in ethical misconduct and compare them with a matched sample of the same number 
of firms from 28 different countries. The results suggest that weak regulatory 
environment and internal corporate governance combined with profitability warnings 
or losses in the preceding year increase organisational ethical vulnerability. We find 
counterintuitive evidence suggesting that firms’ involvement in bribery and corruption 
prevention training programmes is positively associated with the likelihood of ethical 
vulnerability. By synthesising insights about individual and corporate behaviour from 
multiple theories, this study extends existing analytical literature on business ethics. 
Our findings have implications for firms’ external regulatory settings, corporate 
governance mechanisms and organisational ethical infrastructure. 
Keywords: Organisational ethical vulnerability, corporate governance, business 
ethics, media, compliance, corporate ethics training programmes 
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to search for explanations for ethically questionable 
practices that manifest in corporate scandals of various kinds. We look for possible 
internal and external factors to an organisation that may explain corporate vulnerability 
to ethically questionable practices. As a legal entity organisation does not have any 
inherent moral compass to evaluate the consequences of its actions from an ethical 
perspective1. Organisations do not act but people within organisations do; hence, while 
explaining unethical corporate behaviour, the individual and collective behaviour of 
people needs to be acknowledged as a potential factor. We argue that ethical choices 
within organisations are influenced by individual values, internal control systems and 
external institutions. This argument is not new and earlier studies provide a descriptive 
framework for classifying ethical issues in business and managerial behaviour (e.g. 
Carroll, 1978; Nash, 1990). Jackson et al.’s (2013) conceptual framework is the closest 
that identifies three factors (individual, organisational and contextual) to explain 
ethical choices in organisations. This conceptual framework recognises that the unit of 
analysis in ethical decision- making is both individual and organisation, but calls for 
empirical research.  
We therefore argue that, although recognising such contractual obligations normatively 
is useful, using this insight for understanding actual corporate conduct is not adequate 
without an analytical framework. This study therefore adds to the existing descriptive 
frameworks of classifying ethical issues by proposing a new construct of 
‘Organisational Ethical Vulnerability’ (OEV) as an analytical framework. We use this 
framework to seek evidence of three interacting agencies of individual, organisation 
and the system within which organisations operate and their impact on the corporate 
behaviour manifested in corporate scandals. We use the word ‘scandal’ in its 
commonly understood meaning found in the Oxford English Dictionary, i.e. “an action 
or event regarded as morally or legally wrong and causing general public outrage”2. 
Corporate scandal is an event or action that is seen as morally or legally wrong and 
generates negative public reaction, creating controversies. 
Corporate scandals are manifestations of unethical behaviour as they mainly mean and 
imply damage to one or more of an organisation’s stakeholders. For example, harm 
done by manipulation of earnings and reporting not only leads to a loss to investors but 
also damages the investors’ trust in financial markets, which increases the overall cost 
of financing in an economy with adverse consequences on investment. A US 
government commissioned report into the causes of the financial crisis in 2007-08 
concluded that “there was a systematic breakdown in accountability and ethics” (GPO-
FCIC, 2011, p. xxii). The report identified not only individual irresponsibility, but also 
listed the financial industry’s general acceptance of the erosion of standards. The 
commission, however, draws attention to the wider business environment landscape 
that let unethical practices in the industry continue to a point where the catastrophic 
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crisis became inevitable. The report documents that causes should be viewed in the 
context of “human nature and individual and societal responsibility” (GPO-FCIC, 
2011, p. xxii). We sympathise with this view, which motivates us to look for a 
framework to analyse this complex phenomenon. Our search leads us to consider the 
role of individuals as managers in organisations.  
We therefore take agency theory as a starting point in this research. This theory offers 
a framework to model the behaviour of managers as individuals in relation to 
principals, primarily shareholders in Anglo-American corporations, who entrust the 
managers to manage corporations in the principals’ best interests. Commonly attributed 
reasons for the agency problem are incomplete contracts and information asymmetry. 
The conflict of interest between managers and principals presents an ethical dilemma, 
because managers favour their own interest instead of that of the principals and are 
therefore committing a breach of trust. This is mainly due to the information advantage 
that managers possess over the principals, and, despite the terms and conditions of their 
contracts, they are able to put their own interests first. If managers in large 
organisations have incomplete contracts and have information advantage, this may not 
cause an agency problem; it is the managers’ choice to use these two factors as 
instruments that exacerbates the agency problem. 
At a more fundamental level, we restate the agency problem as an ethical problem 
rather than a contractarian anomaly. An objection to this proposition may be that trust 
is not legally construed as a binding condition in a contract; hence, breach of trust is 
not within the scope of agency theory. The response to such an objection is not far from 
the normal expectations of the fiduciary relationship that managers are supposed to 
have with their principals. The fiduciary duties of managers and boards of directors 
require that the agency relationship is based on trust and confidence. Therefore, we 
restate the agency problem as ethical tension for managers and corporate governance 
mechanisms as a way of mitigating the agency problem. An important aspect of this 
restatement is that it allows us to consider internal corporate governance systems as an 
attempt to deal with ethical problems where the agency relation is an instrument 
through which ethical choice is exercised. 
Institutional theory offers a lens to explore the interaction of organisational responses 
in relation to societal expectations (Chen and Roberts, 2010). This theory focuses on 
the social and other structures and norms external to an organisation to which it may 
conform. The externally focused corporate governance mechanisms such as 
transparent reporting, and compliance with codes and regulations constitute a response 
to the external organisational and institutional environment. Thus, we combine 
individual, organisational and institutional contexts as three agencies that increase or 
decrease corporations’ vulnerability of ethical conduct. In section two, we develop the 
concept of ethical vulnerability as a function of these three interrelated factors. 
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We tested our model by developing several hypotheses and found that most factors 
related to internal corporate governance and financial performance, external 
institutional and business context, and organisational ethical infrastructure, are good 
predictors of OEV. The results show that weak regulatory environment and internal 
corporate governance combined with profitability warnings or losses in the preceding 
year increase OEV. We find counterintuitive evidence suggesting that training 
employees on the prevention of corruption and bribery increases OEV. Our analytical 
framework enables us to take a holistic view and analyse a range of external and 
internal factors affecting organisational ethical choices. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a framework of OEV 
by discussing the role of individual, internal and institutional contexts. In section 3, we 
discuss ethics in light of individuals’ moral judgement and institutional theories to 
develop our hypotheses. This is followed by section 4, which describes the 
methodology, sample and data collection procedures. Section 5 provides a discussion 
on the main analysis and results, whilst section 6 concludes this paper by summarising 
the findings and contributions. 
2. The Organisational Ethical Vulnerability (OEV) Framework 
Fraudulent, unethical and illegal corporate behaviour assumes significance beyond the 
breach of agency contract with shareholders, who obviously suffer a loss in terms of 
the market value of their investment. Accounting practices involving earnings 
management are widespread in all sectors, and undermine the reliability of financial 
statements and the confidence of investors in financial markets (Global Fraud Study, 
2016). Some recent corporate scandals involving major companies around the world 
(e.g. Volkswagen and Mitsubishi’s fuel emission, and Tesco’s accounting scandals) 
illustrate the range of corporate behaviour that undermines expected commitment 
towards transparent and responsible business behaviour. These scandals were 
considered by the market to be shocks and had a devastating effect on the market value 
of the involved companies. The level of market reaction to these scandals indicates that 
shareholders give a great deal of importance to business ethics and expect businesses 
to be ethical. However, attempts to theoretically model such corporate behaviour have 
been fragmented, focusing on individuals, or on internal organisational controls or on 
external factors such as law enforcement. We propose to synthesise different 
theoretical perspectives to develop an analytical framework to determine what makes 
organisations ethically vulnerable. 
We start with a discussion of the concept of ethics and its relation to business context. 
Managers’ individual and ethical decision making are then discussed, followed by a 
discussion of earlier attempts that offered approaches to classify ethical issues in 
relation to the individual, organisation and external environment. We add to this strand 
of literature by proposing an analytical framework outlining the expected relationship 
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between the three interacting agencies. In this research ethical vulnerability is used in 
the sense of susceptibility of an organisation to unethical behaviour. Such corporate 
behaviour includes illegal as well as legal but ethically questionable activities. We 
distinguish this from a notion of vulnerability found in the literature where one party 
is seen as vulnerable to another party due to power or information advantage (Brown, 
2013). Vulnerability of investors to managerial behaviour when directors in a corporate 
business entity fail in their fiduciary duties to protect the interests of shareholders is an 
example of vulnerability. This example is articulated in finance literature as the agency 
problem, which is also the rationale underpinning corporate governance codes. We 
argued above that the agency problem can be seen as an ethical issue as it is a breach 
of trust in the principal agent relationship in which information asymmetry and/or 
incomplete contract may be used by an agent as instruments. However, such a 
relationship-based vulnerability is a distinct concept. Organisational ethical 
vulnerability, we propose, is a phenomenon of organisations becoming prone to 
unethical business conduct as manifested through business decisions that violate 
ethical principles. 
Nash (1990, p.5) defines business ethics as “the study of how personal moral norms 
apply to the activities and goals of commercial enterprise. It is not a separate moral 
standard, but the study of how the business context poses its own unique problems for 
a moral person who acts as an agent of this system.” Three areas of managerial decision 
making identified by Nash are choices about what the laws should be and whether to 
follow them; choices about economic and social issues outside the domain of law; and 
choices about the priority of self-interest over the company’s interests. This scope of 
ethical decision making thus encompasses all actions and ‘all systems involved in the 
exchange of goods and services’. Schwartz (2016) proposes an integrated approach to 
ethical decision making which is modelled as a function of individual moral capacity 
and situational factors, such as, ethical issues on hand, organisational setup (we discuss 
this below) and personal context, for instance, individuals’ personal circumstances, 
motives, time and financial constraints. 
The role of an individual is central to understanding corporate behaviour. Carroll 
(1978) offers a five-level framework to improve ethical behaviour in society, namely: 
individual, organisational, association, societal and international. However, while 
Carroll’s framework is plausible it is not a theoretically grounded proposition. To 
address this issue, we provide theoretical grounding about moral judgement by 
individuals in section three. Likewise, Matthews et al. (1985) developed a framework 
for classifying ethical issues and levels using three categories of ethics: ethics of the 
person, ethics of the organisation and ethics of the system. In this classification, the 
institutional context comprising the customs, laws and values of a region is covered in 
ethics of the system. Ethics of the organisation covers written formal, informal norms 
and ways of doing business, and the ethics of a person category comprises personal 
values and principles. Nonetheless, this normative framework does not lend itself to 
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empirical testing, primarily because, in the absence of a clear definition of the three 
components that could be observed and in the absence of a clear statement of how the 
three components interact, the analytical value of this framework is constrained.  Other 
studies have focused on individual choices in simulated scenarios with student 
participants (e.g. Lopez et al., 2009; McDevitt et al., 2007). Along with Jackson et al. 
(2013), all these studies call for empirical research that use an integrated model that 
could explain ethical decision making in organisations. 
From the foregoing discussion, we find that ethics at the individual level are moral 
principles including values that guide an individual’s approach to dealing with ethical 
dilemmas. We also note that, in the case of managers, the organisational context – such 
as codes of conduct – has an impact on the ethical choices and, finally, there are 
external customs, norms and codes. We therefore see this as part of a wider set of 
possible factors that may lead to unethical corporate behaviour. Schwartz (2016) calls 
individual accountability, ethical conduct, and internal checks and balances within the 
organisational environment the situational context constituting an ‘ethical 
infrastructure’. Matthews et al. (1985) call this the ethics of the person and ethics of 
the organisation in their model. The internal organisational factors that influence the 
ethical conduct of a business entity include organisational policies such as 
remuneration policy, whistle blowing, corporate training, rewards and punishments for 
performance targets, codes of conduct, codes of ethics and organisational culture 
(Coffee Jr, 2005). In summary, this set includes organisational efforts that enhance the 
moral capacity of individuals and comprises business ethics initiatives and executive 
skills that affect organisational ethical vulnerability. We adapt the ‘ethical 
infrastructure’ term from the theoretical model of an organisation’s ethical 
effectiveness from Tenbrunsel et al. (2003) and use it as the Organisational Ethical 
Infrastructure (OEI) construct in our proposed framework. If a person’s behaviour is 
reinforced by organisational commitment and action to support ethical choices, this 
may be expected to reduce OEV. 
Internal corporate governance systems – such as, the role of non-executive directors 
and the independence of audit committees – are expected to critically scrutinise 
management decisions and thereby provide a check on unethical practices. Executive 
compensation is viewed as an incentive to manage financial performance and could be 
a potential incentive to indulge in unethical practices such as management of earnings 
and fraudulent financial reporting practices. Effective internal corporate governance is 
therefore expected to reduce organisational ethical vulnerability. We call this set the 
Internal Corporate Governance and Financial Performance (ICGFP). It comprises 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance context, which 
is informed by the agency theory propositions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These 
factors have been examined in various studies as internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (e.g. Cai et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
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Drawing from institutional theories and the above discussion (also see Schwartz, 2016; 
Nash, 1990;  and Carroll, 1978), it is clear that the external institutional and business 
context comprising country-specific quality of regulation, investor protection, rule of 
law, governance and economic development affects OEV. We call this External 
Context and Impact Enablers (ExCItE). The foregoing articulation of the potential 
factors that impact OEV provides analytical schema (Figure 1) that we use to test a 
framework of OEV. We posit that OEV is a function of ExCItE, OEI and ICGFP. In 
this model, we took incidence of corporate scandals as a proxy for organisational 
ethical vulnerability. 
Figure 1: Model of organisational ethical vulnerability 
                            
 
 
 
 
3. Hypotheses development  
Individual approaches to deal with ethical dilemma have been broadly divided into two 
main categories. On the one hand, rationalist approaches assume that individuals go 
through a systematic process of understanding and analysing ethical dilemmas, 
considering the implications of possible responses to such dilemmas and then arrive at 
a moral judgement (Kohlberg, 1973; Schwartz, 2016). On the other hand, the 
intuitionist approach is based on intuition/emotions. The rational process guiding 
individual choices involves factors such as knowledge, values, attitudes and intentions 
as well as organisational reference groups, codes and their enforcement, rewards and 
punishment (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). Using Kohlberg (1973) model to propose a 
situational interaction process of moral reasoning, Trevino (1986) argues that the 
rationalist process of moral judgement involves interaction between the person’s stage 
of moral development and the situation, and proposed a ‘person-situation 
interactionist’ model of ethical decision-making. This implies that ethical decision 
making is a function of an individual cognitive process that involves moral 
development/capacity/orientation, and its interaction with situational factors. Jones 
(1991) introduced another component by identifying the nature of the ethical issue 
itself as a factor, and argues that the ethical intensity of an issue varies in terms of 
consequences and the nature of those consequences which affects decision making. 
Organisational Ethical 
Infrastructure 
External Context and Impact 
Enablers  
Internal Corporate Governance 
and Financial Performance 
(ICGFP) 
Organisational Ethical 
Vulnerability 
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The foregoing discussion of the individual ethical decision-making process shows that 
it involves interaction with other organisational actors, processes and policies as well 
as the external context of the business, which all have a bearing on decision making. 
This leads us to consider theories that situate organisations in a wider societal context 
and theorise about organisational conduct by exploring the relationship between 
organisation and society. There are different theoretical perspectives that help in 
understanding the organisation–society relationship. Chen and Roberts (2010) discuss 
four overlapping theories (legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence 
theory and stakeholder theory) in the context of social and environmental accounting 
research.3 Of particular relevance to our study are legitimacy and institutional theories 
as we seek to establish the likely impact of various factors that may prevent unethical 
practices. 
Organisational legitimacy depends on the perception of wider stakeholders in society 
regarding the congruence of organisational and social goals. It is worth noting that an 
organisation’s legitimacy is conferred by external stakeholders. Therefore, 
organisational response may be guided by the impact of business decisions on external 
stakeholders’ perception about the company. Institutional theory argues that, in order 
to seek legitimation, organisations respond to social, legal and traditional institutional 
structures (Chen and Roberts, 2010). This theory, however, differs from legitimacy 
theory in its scope. While legitimacy of a business activity may be questioned by value 
systems, institutional theory considers the established norms, laws and customs that an 
organisation is expected to follow to gain legitimacy. 
We derive a conceptual framework (see Figure 1) for analysing organisational ethical 
vulnerability. This framework is based on the propositions of agency, legitimacy and 
institutional theories, and combines insights from models of individual ethical decision 
making and corporate behaviour. The three constructs we propose draw from an 
integrated model of individual decision making (Schwartz, 2016). We argue that 
considering only individual ethical vulnerability is unlikely to offer a good explanation 
about organisational controversies as there are important situational factors within and 
outside an organisation that are part of an individual’s ethical decision-making process. 
This leads us to propose three overlapping sets of potential factors that may explain 
OEV. In the following section, we organise and discuss relevant literature under these 
three constructs and develop hypotheses accordingly. 
 
External context and impact enablers (ExCItE) 
 
Institutional theory proposes that organisational choices are constrained and guided by 
the social, legal and economic contexts of the countries in which they operate. 
Similarly, under the propositions of legitimacy theory, organisational activities are 
judged on the basis of the value systems of the societies in which they operate. This 
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leads us to propose that organisations are expected to conduct their business using 
ethical principles, and comply with the legal and regulatory requirements of the 
countries in which they operate. Hence, by using country-level factors we expect to 
have an enabling impact on ethical business practices. Country-level institutional 
quality and efficient regulatory systems offer significant protections for investors and 
stakeholders. 
The law and finance literature suggests that, as compared to civil law systems, common 
law countries have the strongest protection for investors (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Existing literature in this area documents that country-level governance factors (e.g. 
rule of law, regulation quality and government effectiveness) and economic indicators 
(e.g. GDP and per capita income) significantly affect firm-level governance practices 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Where country-level institutions are weak and firm-
level enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough, the internal and external control 
mechanisms would not safeguard the interests of shareholders and stakeholders. In a 
society, where ethical standards are high, the ethical expectation of a business will also 
be high, and, in seeking legitimacy, organisations will have to conform to strict ethical 
standards. In line with this, existing evidence suggests that strong external governance 
mechanisms (e.g. legal systems) are complementary mechanisms which define the 
formal and informal guidelines for the board of directors, ownership structure and 
executive compensation (Aguilera et al., 2015). In order to capture the impact of 
country-level regulation, we include regulation quality, strength of investor protection, 
rule of law and government effectiveness as the country-level factors in this study, and 
apply an integrated framework of country-level governance indicators and firm-level 
governance mechanisms to develop the following hypothesis: 
H1: Country-level institutional quality is negatively associated with organisational 
ethical vulnerability. 
Organisational ethical infrastructure (OEI) 
Organisational ethical infrastructure also affects the ethical decision making of 
individuals, which in turn affects the ethical behaviour of organisations (Craft, 2013). 
A corporate ethics programme and initiative covers “the values, policies and activities’ 
that affect firms’ behaviour” (Brenner, 1992, p. 393). It is therefore argued that 
developing a code of ethics and business conduct will not only help in promoting 
ethical behaviour but can also be used as a publicity tool to preserve or legitimise 
corporate actions (Rodriguez-Dominguez et al., 2009). Moreover, in the age of 
technology and excessive availability of information, firms are increasingly facing 
pressures from stakeholders and regulators to develop their own code of ethics. The 
print, electronic and social media are amongst the other sources of external disciplinary 
mechanisms which have recently been proven very effective in naming and shaming 
unethical corporate behaviour (Wang and Ye, 2015). As a result, firms are sensitive 
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about their corporate reputation and public image. In the event of an actual or potential 
unethical activity, a vibrant media may drag in the top corporate officials from 
‘boardroom to courtroom’ and eventually to the newsroom (Brickey, 2008). 
In addition, existing literature generally divides a firm’s commitment to business ethics 
into two dimensions, namely: (a) the implicit dimensions and (b) the explicit 
dimensions, where the implicit dimensions include ethical leadership, corporate culture 
and ethical training, and the explicit dimensions include the existence of policy 
manuals, code of ethics, ethics committees and ethics hotlines (Brenner, 1992; Pae and 
Choi, 2011). In line with this, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al. (2009) argue that local 
cultures and institutional factors significantly affect the contents of ethics codes in 
different countries. In recent years, many countries have introduced an organisational 
code of ethics and other business conduct-related regulations. As a result, large 
organisations have introduced training programmes that cover different aspects of the 
prevailing ethics regulations. However, the outcome of existing empirical research on 
the effectiveness of ethics codes and business conduct is inconclusive (Kaptein and 
Schwartz, 2008). Discussing the implications of ethics codes, Clegg et al. (2007, p.112) 
assert that codes provide prescriptive guidance on differentiating between ‘good’ and 
‘wrong’ things, where an individual has the responsibility for deciding on one of a 
number of available choices. 
There is consensus among academics and practitioners that, multinational 
organisations are more vulnerable to issues of business ethics since their operations are 
subject to different regulatory requirements, business practices, social norms, values, 
and cultures. In response to the emergence of anti-corruption/bribery regulations 
following recent business scandals, companies have started providing face-to-face 
and/or online training programmes on the implications of these regulations. Clegg et 
al. (2007) argue that it needs to be empirically investigated how individuals 
comply/non-comply or ignore and interpret differently certain aspects of ethical codes, 
because full compliance with ethics codes may not necessarily prevent unethical 
activities. In line with this, some organisations have taken a more principles-based 
approach by voluntarily adopting measures to improve business ethics in their 
operations (such as developing policies on whistle-blower protection, providing 
ombudsman services, establishing hotlines for reporting questionable activities, etc.). 
Therefore, consistent with the findings of Pae and Choi (2011), we argue that training 
initiatives and explicit commitment to business ethics will promote ethical behaviour 
in organisations, and hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between organisational ethical infrastructure and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
12 
 
Internal corporate governance and financial performance (ICGFP) 
 
Non-executive directors and independence of audit committees  
 
According to agency theory, the appointment of non-executive directors enhances 
board-level monitoring and oversight in companies (Jensen, 1993). The presence of 
non-executive directors (NEDs) on corporate boards has been linked with a number of 
key functions in the existing literature. First, NEDs help in monitoring management 
actions on behalf of shareholders; second, they provide strategic advice on key business 
decisions; and, third, they bring resources to their companies (Fama, 1980). In line with 
this, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) argue that NEDs bring independent judgement 
to the board. Consequently, many studies have investigated the impact of NEDs on 
various organisational outcomes such as financial performance (e.g. Singh et al., 
2017), risk disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) and the survival of firms during 
difficult economic times (Mangena et al., 2012). 
There is also evidence in the existing literature which suggests that increasing the 
percentage of NEDs on corporate boards and audit committees decrease a firm’s 
probability of restating its financial statements (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004). Similarly, Chen et al. (2006) 
document that a higher ratio of NEDs is associated with lower incidence of fraud in 
Chinese organisations. Likewise, in a cross-country analysis of 760 firms, García-
Sánchez et al. (2015) find that the presence of independent directors on corporate 
boards successfully promotes the implementation of ethical codes of conduct in 
organisations. 
The importance of independent NEDs could also be explained by the fact that the 
majority of corporate governance codes around the world now require companies to 
appoint a specific number of non-executive directors to their boards. In light of the 
above discussions and based on the assumptions of agency theory, we argue that firms 
with a higher percentage of NEDs on their corporate boards and audit committees are 
less likely to be ethically vulnerable. In line with this, the following research 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between board independence and organisational 
ethical vulnerability. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Board Size 
Board size is an important factor that has been associated with various organisational 
outcomes. When a corporate board becomes larger, coordination among members 
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becomes difficult, and thus it becomes dysfunctional and less effective (Jensen, 1993). 
In contrast, members of smaller boards are more likely to work as a team, which leads 
to better decision making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). While employing the agency 
theory framework, most of the published studies in this area show a negative 
relationship between board size and various measures of firm performance (Adams and 
Jiang, 2017; Yermack, 1996). Other studies that follow the same theoretical framework 
have examined board size and its association with other organisational outcomes, such 
as the probability of restatement of companies’ financial statements (Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005) and the incidence of corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006). The findings 
of most of these studies regard board size as an important element in organisational 
outcomes. 
In relation to ethical responsibilities, García-Sánchez et al. (2015) argue that a board 
size of more than 15 members may lead to a less optimal monitoring process, which 
may affect a firm’s commitment to business ethics. It is therefore argued that, if larger 
boards are not playing an active role in maintaining business ethics, and are also less 
effective in the monitoring and decision-making processes, then companies with larger 
boards are more likely to be involved in corporate scandals. Hence, we hypothesise 
that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between board size and organisational ethical 
vulnerability. 
Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity on corporate boards is another important governance mechanism 
which has received considerable attention in recent years. Several countries in Europe 
(e.g. France, Germany and Norway) have already implemented a fixed quota for female 
directors on corporate boards. Support for gender diversity on boards is also 
strengthened by the findings of existing corporate governance literature. In particular, 
evidence in the existing literature has shown a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and various organisational outcomes, such as firm performance (Post and 
Byron, 2015), firm reputation (Musteen et al., 2010), success in mergers and 
acquisitions (Ben-Amar et al., 2013), CEO turnover (Elsaid and Ursel, 2017) and CSR 
performance (Boulouta, 2013; Harrigan, 1981). 
It has also been documented in the existing literature that male and female directors’ 
ethical perception is significantly different (Ibrahim et al., 2009), and, as compared to 
men, female directors have higher sensitivity towards ethical issues in business 
operations (Simga-Mugan et al., 2005). For instance, women tend to see questionable 
business practices as more unethical than men do and try to avoid such practices 
(Deshpande et al., 2000). We therefore argue that companies with gender diversity on 
their boards will be less vulnerable to ethics-related incidents, and propose the 
following hypothesis: 
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H6: There is a negative relationship between board gender diversity and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Executive compensation 
In order to control the opportunistic behaviour of directors and align their interests with 
those of the shareholders, firms can use performance-based compensation schemes 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, performance-based compensation schemes 
can lead to short-termism, which is regarded as the downside of such schemes and can 
create further agency problems (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Van Yperen et al. (2011) 
argue that increasing the emphasis on goal achievement encourages unethical 
behaviour among individuals, and it is therefore expected that performance-based 
compensation would encourage boards of directors to become involved in unethical 
practices. In line with this, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that companies 
where the CEO’s overall compensation is sensitive to company share prices are 
involved in a higher level of earnings management practices. Similarly, other studies 
show a positive association between stock-option-based compensation and the 
likelihood of fraud (Denis et al., 2006). Furthermore, recent evidence in the existing 
literature shows that firms select weak performing peers to set CEO performance-based 
pay (Skovoroda and Bruce, 2017), which could indicate unethical business practice. It 
is therefore argued that senior executive compensation might encourage directors to 
try and achieve the target performance measure(s) irrespective of the ethical 
consequences of their decisions, which could lead to business ethics-related scandals. 
As a consequence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between senior executives’ compensation and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Number of board meetings 
Another widely used corporate governance mechanism in the existing governance 
research is board activity, which is generally measured as the number of board 
meetings during an organisation’s reporting period. From an agency theory 
perspective, increasing the number of board meetings may signal increased vigilance 
and monitoring at the top. However, while investigating the relationship between board 
activities and firm performance, Vafeas (1999) documents that board activities are 
likely to increase following poor financial performance in the preceding year. 
Similarly, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argue that external market pressures 
originating from a firm’s financial distress may significantly influence the firm’s 
management to change its governance arrangements (e.g. increasing board meetings). 
In the context of corporate scandals, one argument is that increasing board meetings 
would enhance a firm’s monitoring and thus minimise the likelihood of corporate 
scandals. A counter argument, however, suggests that, following the publication of a 
firm’s corporate scandal in the media, the number of its board meetings may increase. 
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In line with this, Chen et al. (2006) show a positive relationship between the number 
of board meetings and the likelihood of accounting scandals for Chinese listed 
companies. We therefore argue that an increase in the number of board meetings would 
indicate organisational ethical vulnerability, and propose the following hypothesis: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Single largest shareholder (Blockholder) 
Ownership structure varies across organisations and plays a significant role in their 
corporate governance mechanisms. Existing studies on ownership structure are 
generally based on the theoretical proposition of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), who 
argue that a concentrated ownership system is a superior control mechanism as 
compared to a dispersed ownership system. However, Chen et al. (2006) argue that in 
a concentrated ownership structure blockholders may have the incentive to either deter 
fraud or to engage in unethical activities and expropriate the rights of minority 
shareholders. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 758) report that large investors 
could use their shareholding rights and redistribute wealth in both efficient and 
inefficient ways for their self-interest. While investigating the ownership 
characteristics of the largest corporate scandals in the USA and Europe, Coffee Jr 
(2005) documents that, as compared to concentrated ownership systems, dispersed 
ownership systems are more vulnerable to different forms of fraud and earnings 
management practices.  
Accordingly, we argue that corporate scandals arise as a result of poor monitoring and 
governance, and the ownership structure of firms plays a significant role in 
organisational frauds. We therefore predict that firms that had no scandals are more 
likely to be owned by large blockholders. Consistent with prior international 
comparative literature on ownership structure (Thomsen et al., 2006), we use a 
threshold of five percent or more to include a proxy for the single largest blockholder, 
and propose that: 
H9: There is a negative relationship between blockholders’ ownership and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Financial factors 
The financial health of a firm plays a vital role in its underlying business and ethical 
behaviour. Several studies have examined the financial characteristics of firms which 
received adverse rulings from the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the UK 
(Peasnell et al., 2001); restated their accounting earnings (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005); 
have been engaged in accounting frauds (Chen et al., 2006); or have been prosecuted 
for committing financial frauds (Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). The findings of these 
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and other published studies in this area suggest that managers are likely to engage in 
earning restatement or financial fraud following a firm’s poor financial performance 
(measured by low growth, losses, poor stock performance, etc.). Other studies, such as 
Barraquier (2011), also confirm that profit-orientation, external market pressures and 
‘financial capacities’ in a competitive environment may restrain managerial ethical 
behaviour. It is therefore argued that poor financial performance may lead to short-
termism and subsequently motivates managers to engage in unethical activities. We 
include three proxies for poor financial performance, namely: profit warnings in the 
preceding year, profit warnings during the defect year (year in which the company had 
a scandal), and losses in the defect year, and hypothesise that: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between poor financial performance and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Table 1 presents a summary of all our hypotheses and relates them to their theoretical 
aspiration and expected results. 
 
Table 1 Summary of hypotheses 
OEV factors Theoretical inspiration Hypotheses Expected effect 
on OEV 
ExCItE Institutional theories: Firms will 
follow the norms and respond to 
external institutions 
H1 Decrease (–) 
OEI Moral development, ethical 
decision making 
H2 Decrease (–) 
ICGFP Agency theory H3, H4, H6, H9 Decrease (–) 
    H5, H7, H8, H10 Increase  (+) 
 
4. Data, sample and methodology 
This study investigates whether ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP affect OEV. Following the 
methodology of Peasnell et al. (2001), we take a sample of firms having corporate 
scandals in recent years, and compare it with a control sample of firms that did not face 
any scandal. The analysis is conducted in two different ways. Firstly, in order to 
investigate any significant differences between the two samples in terms of ExCItE, 
OEI, and ICGFP, we perform a univariate analysis. Secondly, to investigate the factors 
that might determine OEV in the sample organisations, we carry out a multivariate 
analysis. We collect data from Datastream for a sample of 253 companies that had 
scandals published in the media from 28 different countries.4 Table 2 shows details of 
the sample companies from different countries/industries. The largest number of 
scandals was recorded in the USA, as 255, from 120 companies and 30 different 
industries, followed by the UK, constituting 46 scandals, from 25 companies. Table 2 
includes the costs associated with corporate scandals in each country, which is 
measured as actual or estimated penalties resulting from the lost court cases, 
settlements or cases not yet settled. These scandals are linked to business ethics in 
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general, and political inducement or bribery and corruption in particular. The monetary 
costs arising from these scandals are over $45 billion in one year for our sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our econometric specification requires the creation of a control sample that is not 
subject to any scandal. Details of our sample selection procedures are explained in 
Table 3 below. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We employ the following probit regression model as our dependent variable is a binary 
outcome. We have chosen our sample firms through the application of a number of 
matching criteria, such as firm size, industry and country. Due to the nature of this 
study, we regard this model as the most appropriate method for this investigation. 
𝑂𝐸𝑉 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑥𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒, 𝑂𝐸𝐼, 𝐼𝐶𝐺𝐹𝑃, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
Table 4 provides definitions of all the variables in the above model. OEV is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a company has a scandal and 0 otherwise. A 
company having more than one scandal also takes the value of 1 in our probit analysis. 
The explanatory variables are: ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP. We also control for leverage 
(LEVER), market-to-book value (MTBV) and duality (DUAL). DUAL takes the value 
of 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person and 0 otherwise. In addition, we 
collected the World Bank country-level data on rule of law, regulation quality, 
government effectiveness, strength of investors’ protection and per capita GDP for 
each country in our sample. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 shows details of the industrial classifications of the sample firms, where the 
largest number constituting 44 firms belong to the banking industry, followed by 23 
firms from the insurance sector, 17 firms from the oil and gas sector, and 15 firms from 
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector. This implies the sensitivity of specific 
industrial sectors, which is evidenced by the highest number of incidents in these 
industries. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. Analysis and Results  
Univariate analysis 
The results of our univariate analysis are reported in Table 6. In terms of ICGFP, the 
results show that firms that face OEV issues have significantly larger board size as 
compared with firms in the control sample. This is consistent with the view that larger 
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boards are less effective in monitoring and are also less likely to fulfil their ethical 
commitments. In addition, as compared with firms in the control sample, all those firms 
that had some kind of OEV pay significantly higher compensation to their directors. 
This is in accord with the assumption that higher compensation can lead to short-
termism. Paying higher compensation to executives could lead to a greater emphasis 
on goal achievement, whereby executives will pursue organisational objectives that 
could lead to wealth maximisations for shareholders, but may not necessarily 
demonstrate a better ethical performance. Contrary to our expectations, the outcome of 
our univariate analysis suggests that firms that had OEV had more independent boards 
and had higher gender diversity on their boards. We therefore could not find support 
for the hypotheses that suggest that board independence and gender diversity are 
negatively associated with OEV. In terms of the audit committee independence, we did 
not find any significant differences between firms that had OEV and those of the 
control sample. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The results also suggest that, as compared to firms in the control sample, firms that had 
OEV had a significantly higher number of board meetings. This is in line with the 
notion that a board of directors is subject to extensive pressures after the appearance of 
the news of their firm’s unethical activities in media. The percentage of shares owned 
by the single biggest owners (SBO) is significantly higher for the control sample, which 
supports the assumption that large shareholders exercise significant monitoring and 
control, and their presence minimises the likelihood of OEV. Interestingly, and 
contrary to our expectations, firms having OEV have significantly higher commitments 
to business ethics. This raises some concerns about the effectiveness of corporate ethics 
programmes. In addition, the univariate analysis results also suggest that a significantly 
higher percentage of firms that had OEV had reported losses in the defect year and/or 
had issued profit warnings before the year of scandal. 
Multivariate analysis 
The results of our correlation analysis are reported in Table 7. As highlighted in Table 
7, the highest correlation coefficient is 0.43, which is much lower than the 
recommended threshold of 0.80 (Field, 2009). In addition, we have also carried out the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for all variables, which is generally regarded as a 
way of quantifying multi-collinearity in regression models. This analysis resulted in 
VIF values of less than 3 for all our variables, which suggests no multi-collinearity 
among the explanatory variables of this study. On the basis of the results of the 
correlation and VIF analysis, we argue that multi-collinearity is not a cause of concern 
in our analyses. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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In order to examine the effects of ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP on the likelihood of OEV, 
we estimate a series of probit regressions, the results of which are reported in Table 8. 
The dependent variable in all probit regression models takes the value of 1 if a firm has 
a scandal and 0 otherwise. The results of all these analyses are discussed below. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The first set of factors in our model that could determine OEV is ExCItE. The results 
show that the relationship between the quality of a country’s legal system (represented 
by regulation quality and rule of law) and OEV is significantly negative. This implies 
that in a strong legal jurisdiction it is less likely that businesses will engage in unethical 
business practices. Two other country-level factors, GDP and government 
effectiveness, are also significantly negatively associated with OEV. The relationship 
between the strength of the investor protection index and OEV is also negative, but this 
relationship is statistically insignificant. In line with institutional and legitimacy 
theories, these results imply that strong legal systems and greater protection for 
shareholders’ rights are important factors in the determination of OEV in different 
jurisdictions. 
Another key determinant of OEV in our framework is OEI. With regard to OEI, we 
find a significantly positive association between bribery and corruption training (BCT) 
and OEV. This indicates that a significantly higher percentage of sample firms that 
allegedly engaged in unethical activities publicly disclose their commitment to 
business ethics programmes – as evidenced by a higher percentage of bribery and 
corruption training programmes by firms involved in unethical activities. This is 
consistent with the findings of Kaptein and Schwartz (2008), which report a weak or 
no significant impact of the corporate ethics programmes. This finding raises concerns 
about the effectiveness of corporate ethics programmes adopted by firms and questions 
the content of the programmes used by organisations. However, in relation to ethics-
related training programmes, the available data do not give details about the providers 
of the training programmes, which may also have implications for these findings. We 
therefore recommend the application of independent and externally evaluated ethical 
assessments on an annual basis for all firms that could ensure the effectiveness of 
corporate ethics-related training programmes which may be different in content for 
different organisations. 
With regard to ICGFP variables, the results reported in Table 8 show that board size is 
significantly positively associated with OEV. This result supports H5, which 
hypothesises a positive relationship between board size and OEV. This is consistent 
with the findings of García-Sánchez et al. (2015) which suggest that larger boards are 
less likely to fulfil their ethical commitments. As larger boards are difficult to 
coordinate and are less effective in monitoring, firms with larger boards are less likely 
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to carefully scrutinise the ethical implications of various business decisions. 
Consequently, firms with larger boards are more likely to be ethically vulnerable. 
The results in Table 8 also indicate that board independence, audit committee 
independence and gender diversity are negatively associated with OEV. However, 
these results are statistically insignificant, which provides only partial support for 
hypotheses H3, H4 and H6. The negative coefficient for single blockholder ownership 
and OEV confirms H9, suggesting that large blockholders exercise a significant 
monitoring role in reducing the likelihood of OEV. The results also show total senior 
executive compensation (TSEC) as significantly positively associated with OEV, 
which thus supports H7. This finding supports the view that managerial incentives can 
lead to short-termism (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In addition, Benson and Davidson 
(2010) argue that executives are compensated for achieving the shareholders’ value 
maximisation goal but not necessarily for having good relationships with the firm’s 
stakeholders. Similarly, higher executive compensation could also encourage directors 
to be more focused on achieving certain targets. In this regard, existing evidence 
suggests that imposing achievement goals on individuals positively affects their 
unethical behaviour (Van Yperen et al., 2011). We therefore argue that higher 
compensation could encourage executives to pursue strategies that would lead to 
increases in shareholders’ wealth and the meeting of certain targets, irrespective of 
considering their ethical implications. As a consequence, offering higher compensation 
to executives would increase OEV. 
The number of board meetings (NBM) is significantly positively associated with OEV. 
This implies that the boards of directors are likely to meet more frequently when the 
media reports negative news about their firms. This is consistent with the findings of 
Chen et al. (2006), who report a significantly positive association between the number 
of board meetings and the likelihood of accounting scandals for Chinese companies. 
In the context of OEV, we argue that these meetings are generally held to discuss the 
circumstances affecting corporate reputation after a scandal and/or to discuss the future 
line of action for an organisation. Consistent with the results reported in the univariate 
analysis, we find a significantly negative relationship between the share ownership of 
single largest shareholders and OEV, which implies the strong monitoring role of large 
shareholders in organisations. 
In terms of financial performance, we find a significantly positive relationship between 
profit warnings issued in the year before the scandal (PW12) and OEV in the 
subsequent year. In Model 2, we include another measure of poor financial 
performance, measured by a dummy variable, PW13, which takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has issued profit warning during the defect year and 0 otherwise. The relationship 
between profit warnings in the defect year and OEV is weakly significant. Similarly, 
in Model 3, we include a measure for poor financial performance, represented by 
LOSS, which takes the value of 1 if a firm has reported losses and 0 otherwise. The 
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relationship between LOSS and OEV is significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting 
that poor financial performance may trigger earnings restatement and accounting 
frauds. In light of all these findings, we argue that regulatory bodies should maintain a 
continuous surveillance of firms reporting losses and firms that issue profit warnings. 
As discussed earlier we have included a number of interactions between various firm-
level and country-level factors in our analysis (see models 6–10). Our results show that 
the interaction between bribery and corruption training and regulation quality is 
significantly positively associated with OEV. This would imply that, in those countries 
where regulation is strong, companies will offer more bribery and corruption training 
programmes to meet institutional requirements and gain legitimacy. However, such 
trainings may not be effective in stopping businesses from carrying out unethical 
activities. Perhaps companies may be using these training programmes as a box-ticking 
exercise to meet certain regulatory requirements rather than implementing processes 
that could prevent unethical activities. This provides further explanation for the 
positive relationship between bribery and corruption training programmes and OEV. 
Robustness tests 
Concerns have been raised in the existing literature regarding econometric 
specifications which fail to control for the issues arising from endogeneity (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). We use the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity and identify board 
size as an endogenous variable. As we employ cross-sectional data in this investigation, 
we use instrumental variables (IV) to control for endogeneity, which is a commonly 
used method for dealing with endogeneity problems in accounting research. In order 
to use a variable as an instrument, it needs to be highly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable but should not be correlated with the error term (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010, p.186). Instrumental variable firm size (measured by logarithm of total 
assets) is highly correlated with board size, and it is unlikely that it can affect OEV 
through the error term. We therefore use firm size as an instrument for board size. The 
results from the IV-probit estimation are reported in Table 9, which indicates that the 
results are unchanged after controlling for endogeneity. In further exploring the 
economic significance of the regression coefficients, we also calculate marginal effect 
as we have used probit estimations. The marginal effect measures the probability of 
sample firms engaging in unethical activities. The results show that a one-unit change 
in profit warnings in the preceding year (PW12) increases the probability of OEV by 
19%. Similarly, the implied probability of OEV increases by a factor of 0.13 for firms 
providing bribery and corruption training programmes (BCT). Finally, the results from 
the Wald test are also insignificant, which confirms that endogeneity is not affecting 
our results and that our regular probit regression results reported in Table 8 are robust. 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This research enhances our understanding of various firm-level and contextual factors 
that could determine the ethical vulnerability of organisations in different countries. 
We examine whether OEV arises as a result of a vacuum in organisational ethical 
infrastructure, corporate governance arrangements, country-level contextual factors or 
poor financial performance. We combine individual, organisational and institutional 
context as the three agencies that increase or decrease organisational ethical 
vulnerability. 
We find that certain board characteristics are associated with OEV. For instance, firms 
with larger boards are more likely to be ethically vulnerable. This finding suggests that 
larger boards are more complex, difficult to coordinate and less effective in monitoring 
(Jensen, 1993). Therefore, larger boards may not be carefully scrutinising the ethical 
implications of various corporate decisions. This finding supports the arguments in the 
existing governance literature that call for limiting corporate board size to seven or 
eight members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) or 15 members (García-Sánchez et al., 
2015). 
In relation to board activity in the defect year, our findings show a significantly positive 
association between the number of board meetings and OEV. This suggests that board 
activities are likely to increase during the year of corporate scandals and that corporate 
response to scandals (evidenced by the number of board meetings during the defect 
year) is generally reactive. Under the contemporary disclosure practices in most 
countries, companies only report the number of board meetings in their annual reports 
and do not show details of issues discussed in those meetings. The outcome of our 
findings suggests that companies may be asked to report precisely how often business 
ethics-related actions are considered in their board meetings. We therefore argue that 
the inclusion of details about ethics-related actions in corporate board meetings will 
allow regulators and other stakeholders to proactively monitor corporate board 
activities, which might help in minimising OEV.  
Another key finding of the study is related to firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms, which indicates that higher senior executive compensation increases 
OEV. From the agency theory perspective, paying higher compensation to executives 
might help to align their interests with those of the shareholders. However, the 
framework of enlightened value maximisation suggests that shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation is not the only priority of a firm and regards other stakeholders as the 
firm’s strategic partners (Jensen, 2002). Our findings suggest that, although 
compensation may be an effective tool to encourage executives to achieve certain 
financial goals, it often fails to encourage them to achieve the organisation’s ethical 
objectives. As performance-based pay is a key requirement of various corporate 
governance codes, this finding supports the view that strict reliance on aggressive 
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financial goals encourages unethical corporate behaviour (Van Yperen et al., 2011). 
This finding has implications for regulators and practitioners, suggesting that the 
achievement of certain ethical performance measures could be incorporated in the 
existing annual targets for senior executives, which could encourage executives to 
make ethical considerations an integral part of their corporate strategy. 
The economic implications of our findings are also significant. We show that the 
financial costs (fines and penalties) relating to OEV are more than $45 billion for a 
sample of 253 firms in just one year. This is a huge amount and has significant 
implications for not only the shareholders but also other stakeholders. Companies pass 
on these costs to their customers, which negatively affect various stakeholders. We 
observe the existence of a high number of bribery and corruption training programmes 
in firms that have experienced ethical vulnerability. These findings thus raise questions 
about the effectiveness of corporate ethics training programmes and show that 
commitment to business ethics may not necessarily decrease OEV.  
The findings of this paper identify poor financial performance as one of the key 
determinants of OEV. Firms issuing profit warnings or reporting losses in the 
preceding/current year are more likely to exhibit OEV. This suggests that poor 
financial performance may lead to short-termism and a panic response at the cost of 
careful consideration of the governance and ethical matters, making organisations 
vulnerable to corporate scandals and controversies. When firms become excessively 
sensitive to short-term forecasts, responses to financial analysts may trigger an intuitive 
rather than a rational decision-making. We argue that poor financial performance 
increases OEV, and in order to mitigate this risk, responsible boards may review the 
sources of pressures or incentives created by rewards and performance management 
systems in their organisations. Therefore, regulatory bodies should develop a 
surveillance system which may issue early warnings about firms that are poorly 
performing in financial terms, and argue that such a proactive approach may help in 
minimising OEV. Our findings also imply that full compliance with governance 
regulations and codes of ethics could often provide misleading signals. For instance, 
fully compliant firms may not easily get caught in the regulatory surveillance system 
and that compliance could be used as an impression management or legitimacy tool to 
improve corporate image. 
With regard to external context and organisational ethical infrastructure, our results 
suggest that country-level institutional factors are important determinants of OEV. It 
is generally expected that companies operating in countries with a strong rule of law, 
good-quality regulation, effective government infrastructure and strong GDP are less 
likely to be ethically vulnerable. However, the occurrence of some recent scandals in 
developed economies contradicts this perception. Our findings suggest that, although 
the quality of regulation and rule of law affect the effectiveness of organisational 
ethical infrastructure in different countries, organisations should also give attention to 
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several other factors. In those countries where is rule of law, companies may offer more 
ethics-related training programmes to their employees. The training programmes are 
although intended to meet certain regulatory requirements, the real motive of firms 
behind such programmes may not necessarily be related to business ethics. This 
provides further explanation for the positive relationship between bribery and 
corruption-related training programmes and OEV. 
These findings have implications for practitioners and policy makers. We regard 
business ethics as an important element of a firm’s strategy and ask for certain 
refinements in the regulatory structure regarding the ethical awareness in firms and the 
structure and content of ethics-related training programmes. Why do executives 
become involved in unethical behaviour, which may result in substantial losses for 
firms in the long run? Various internal and external situational factors which may 
influence ethical choices made by executives have been examined in this research. 
However, further insights can be gained by direct examination of individual behaviour 
in situational context that our study has proposed. In addition, at firm-level, the 
structure of ethics-related training programmes and details of who is delivering those 
programmes would need detailed scrutiny. For instance, the contents of an ethics-
related training programme provided by a professional accountancy firm would be 
different than that offered by a management consulting firm, as the former may focus 
more extensively on complex accounting and tax-related ethical issues, while the latter 
may provide a more holistic overview of business ethics in the corporate world. In this 
way, the quality of such training programmes could then be linked with OEV in a more 
meaningful way to understand their effectiveness.  
More broadly, this study has shown that individual and organisational ethical decisions 
are inter-related in real life and that only partial understanding can be obtained from 
studying just the financial effects of ethical, social or environmental reporting. Further 
research is needed to validate the strength of these inter-relationships between external, 
internal and individual factors that could make an organisation ethically vulnerable. 
Future studies may also explore changes in a firm’s corporate governance structure 
(e.g. board size, composition and ownership structure) and market reactions subsequent 
to scandals to understand the quality of external oversight. Finally, our model of OEV 
could be applied in an interdisciplinary context, particularly when examining scandals 
in the areas of accounting, finance, marketing, human resource management, and 
logistics and supply chain management. 
Despite the substantial contributions of this paper, the findings are subject to 
limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to capture 
variations in firm-specific governance and financial characteristics after the scandals. 
Second, the role of firm-level risk management committees could have significant 
implications for OEV. Owing to the unavailability of such data for our cross-national 
sample, we are unable to capture such impact in our research. Finally, when confronted 
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with an ethical dilemma, a board of director may conduct a cost-benefit analysis, which 
may lead to the adoption of strategies that are profitable, yet unethical. However, 
investigating this aspect is not possible from our data and is therefore left to future 
research. 
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Table 2 Sample characteristics     
Countries 
No. of 
Industries 
No. of 
Companies 
No. of 
Scandals 
% of scandals 
in each country 
Costs of Corporate 
scandals ($ 
millions) 
Cost in each 
country as a % 
of total cost 
Australia 4 9 13 2.863% 30.98 0.068% 
Belgium 1 1 2 0.441% 3.25 0.007% 
Brazil 1 1 1 0.220% NA NA 
Canada 8 10 11 2.423% 336.14 0.743% 
China 3 4 7 1.542% 8.27 0.018% 
Denmark 2 2 2 0.441% NA NA 
France 9 10 15 3.304% 412.53 0.911% 
Germany  8 11 20 4.405% 1984.93 4.385% 
Greece 1 1 1 0.220% 0.09 0.000% 
Hong Kong 2 2 5 1.101% 249.00 0.550% 
India 5 7 10 2.203% 1110.40 2.453% 
Ireland 1 1 1 0.220% 0.12 0.000% 
Israel 2 2 2 0.441% 1.65 0.004% 
Italy 5 5 6 1.322% 0.78 0.002% 
Japan 4 5 5 1.101% 632.94 1.398% 
Malaysia 2 2 2 0.441% NA NA 
Mexico 2 2 2 0.441% 10.76 0.024% 
Netherlands 6 6 7 1.542% 26.34 0.058% 
Norway 2 2 2 0.441% 16.48 0.036% 
Russia 1 1 2 0.441% 88.92 0.196% 
South Africa 4 4 4 0.881% 32.79 0.072% 
South Korea 5 8 9 1.982% 0.00 0.000% 
Spain 1 1 1 0.220% NA NA 
Sweden 3 3 5 1.101% 9.26 0.020% 
Switzerland 5 6 16 3.524% 435.31 0.962% 
Thailand  2 2 2 0.441% 1.27 0.003% 
United 
Kingdom 12 25 46 10.132% 3093.48 6.834% 
United States 30 120 255 56.167% 36782.99 81.255% 
Total 131 253 454 100% 45268.69 100% 
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Table 3 Panel A – Sample selection criteria  
Step 1: We searched for those companies having scandals published in media from a total of 3,898 companies in the 
Datastream 'Asset4 Universe' between 2002 and 2015.  
 
 
Step 2: We identified 520 firms having scandals published in media from a total of 3,898 companies  
 
 520 
 
Step 3: We excluded 200 firms that were accused by media but were not yet penalised by any court of law/regulatory body or 
where no case was initiated by a court of law  
 
(200) 
Initial sample 
 
 
 320 
  
 
Step 4: A corresponding control firm was chosen from the same industry and country. Following Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2001), the total assets of a matched (control) firm should be in the range of ± 25% of the total assets of a defect firm which 
resulted in the deletion of 67 firms from the sample [as those firms did not fulfil the matching criterion]. 
 
  (67) 
Step 5: Our final sample comprises 253 firms from 28 countries for the year 2013. The year 2013 was chosen as the sample 
year, because the highest number of corporate scandals have been reported during this year. 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Panel B – Firm Size* 
Variable Firms having scandals Control sample p-value for difference 
Market-to-book value (MTBV) 2.10232 2.239167 0.8171 
A paired sample t-test is used to evaluate the differences in means for the market-to-book value of equity for firms having scandals and for the 
control sample. 
*Firm Size is measured as the market-to-book value of equity.  
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Table 4 Definition of variables   
Variables  Definition 
Source/Datastream 
Code 
Organisational Ethical Vulnerability 
(OEV) 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company has a 
scandal published in the media linked to business ethics in general, 
political contributions or bribery and corruption, otherwise 0. 
SOCODP058 
External Context and Impact Enablers (ExCItE) 
 
Regulation quality (REGQUA) The index measures how governments formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
World Bank indicator 
Strength of investor protection index 
(SIPI) 
This index is an average of three indices: the extent of disclosure 
index, the extent of director liability index, and the ease of 
shareholder suit index. The index ranges from 0 (little to no 
investor protection) to 10 (greater investor protection). 
World Bank indicator 
Rule of Law (RULEOFLAW) The index measures the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. Values vary from 0 (non-existent) to 100 (excellent). 
World Bank indicator 
Government effectiveness 
(GOVEFECT) 
The index which ranges from 0 to 100 measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures. 
World Bank indicator 
GDP per capita (LOGGDP) Logarithm of per capita GDP in US dollars. World Bank indicator 
Organisational Ethical Infrastructure (OEI) 
 
Bribery and corruption training (BCT) Does the company train its employees on the prevention of 
corruption and bribery? 1 if yes, otherwise 0. 
SOCODP008 
Explicit commitments to business ethics 
(ECBI) 
Does the company have appropriate communication tools (whistle 
blower, ombudsman, suggestion box, ethics hotline, newsletter, 
website, etc.) to improve general business ethics? 1 if yes, 
otherwise 0. 
SOCODP0101 
Skills (SKILL) The percentage of board members who have either an industry-
specific background or a strong financial background.  
CGBSO04S 
Internal Corporate Governance and Financial Performance (ICGFP) 
 
Board size (BSIZE) The total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. CGBSDP060 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) Percentage of non-executive board members. CGBSO06V 
Number of board meetings (NBM) The number of board meetings during the year. CGBFDP024 
Gender diversity (GD) Percentage of women on the board of directors. CGBSO17V 
Total senior executives’ compensation 
(TSEC) 
Logarithm of the total compensation paid to all senior executives 
(if total aggregate is reported by the company). 
CGCPDP054 
Single largest/biggest shareholder/owner 
(SBO) 
The percentage ownership of the single largest/biggest owner (by 
voting power) having shares ownership ≥ 5%. 
CGSRDP045 
Audit committee independence (ACI) Percentage of non-executive board member on the audit 
committee. 
CGBFDP018 
Profit warnings (PW12) 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning in the year before the 
scandal, otherwise 0. ECSLDP059 
Profit warnings (PW13) 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning during the defect year, 
otherwise 0. ECSLDP059 
Loss in the defect year (LOSS) 1 if the company has reported loss in the year of scandal, otherwise 
0. 
 
Costs of corporate scandals (CCS) All real or estimated penalties, fines from lost court cases, 
settlements or cases not yet settled regarding these scandals linked 
to business ethics in general, political contributions or bribery and 
corruption. 
SOCODP059 
Control Variables 
  
Leverage (LEVER) A firm's total debt divided by its total assets. WC03255/WC02999 
Market-to-book value (MTBV) This is defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity divided by the balance sheet value of the ordinary 
(common) equity. 
MTBV 
Dual (DUAL) 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person, 0 otherwise. CGBSO09V 
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Table 5 Industrial composition of the sample firms 
Industry name No. of companies  % 
Aerospace/Defence 11 4.35 
Air Freight/Courier Services 1 0.40 
Airline Services 1 0.40 
Automobiles/Auto Parts 4 1.58 
Banking Services 44 17.39 
Beverages 2 0.79 
Biotechnology/Medical Research 3 1.19 
Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals 15 5.93 
Chemicals 1 0.40 
Coal 2 0.79 
Commercial Services/Supplies 6 2.37 
Communications Equipment 1 0.40 
Construction/Engineering/Materials  7 2.77 
Electric Utilities 5 1.98 
Energy-Related Equipment/Services 7 2.77 
Food/Drug Retailing 4 1.58 
Food/Tobacco 10 3.95 
Gas Utilities 2 0.79 
Healthcare Equipment/Supplies 4 1.58 
Healthcare Providers/Services 6 2.37 
Hotels/Entertainment Services 6 2.37 
Household Goods 2 0.79 
Industrial Conglomerates 8 3.16 
Insurance 23 9.09 
Investment Services 11 4.35 
Machinery/Equipment/Components 6 2.37 
Media/Publishing 7 2.77 
Metal/Mining 11 4.35 
Oil and Gas 17 6.72 
Personal/Household Products/Services 3 1.19 
Rails/Roads Transportation 1 0.40 
Real Estate Operations 1 0.40 
Retailers – Diversified 3 1.19 
Retailers – Specialty 2 0.79 
Semiconductors/Semiconductor Equipment 2 0.79 
Software/IT Services 3 1.19 
Telecommunications Services 11 4.35 
Total 253 100 
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Note: Definitions of the variables are reported in Table 4 
 
 
Table 6 Univariate (mean) comparisons of companies having scandals and control sample of matched-
pairs for the defect year 2013 
Variables 
 
Observations 
Firms having 
scandals 
Control 
sample 
p-value for 
difference 
Internal Corporate Governance and Financial Performance (ICGFP) 
BSIZE 497 12.30435 10.63934 <0.001 
NEDs 497 81.21787 78.46889 0.0316 
NBM 477 9.995951 8.83913 0.0051 
GD 497 17.75802 14.12119 0.0001 
SBO 427 16.27077 20.74534 0.013 
TSEC 468 7.345119 7.073186 <0.001 
ACI 502 99.3083 98.59438 0.1469 
PW12 492 0.4347826 0.1818182 <0.001 
LOSS 506 0.1225296 0.0671937 0.0337 
Organisational Ethical Infrastructure (OEI) 
BCT 506 0.7272727 0.4347826 <0.001 
ECBI 505 0.8695652 0.7579365 0.0012 
SKILL 505 43.99631 49.85253 0.0159 
Control variables     
LEVER 506 0.2354032 0.247459 0.4107 
DUAL 506 0.4071146 0.3320158 0.0804 
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Table 7 Correlation matrix 
  OEV BSIZE NEDs NBM GD DUAL SBO TSEC ACI BCT ECBI LEVER PW12 LOSS REGQUA SIPI  SKILL MTBV 
OEV 1.00                  
BSIZE 0.25 1.00                 
NEDs 0.10 0.07 1.00                
NBM 0.13 -0.05 -0.01 1.00               
GD 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.05 1.00              
DUAL 0.08 -0.05 0.30 -0.10 -0.02 1.00             
SBO -0.12 0.11 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 1.00            
TSEC 0.28 0.16 0.29 -0.06 0.16 0.21 -0.38 1.00           
ACI 0.06 0.10 0.25 -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.08 0.28 1.00          
BCT 0.30 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.21 0.04 -0.06 0.29 0.11 1.00         
ECBI 0.14 -0.06 0.35 0.00 0.13 0.16 -0.14 0.39 0.09 0.23 1.00        
LEVER -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00       
PW12 0.27 0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.18 0.04 -0.13 0.30 0.09 0.24 0.21 0.04 1.00      
LOSS 0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.06 1.00     
REGQUA 0.01 -0.10 0.12 0.07 0.27 -0.01 -0.38 0.41 0.18 0.13 0.19 -0.12 0.11 -0.04 1.00    
SIPI 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.14 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.22 1.00   
SKILL -0.11 -0.29 -0.17 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.18 -0.03 0.07 0.09 1.00  
MTBV -0.11 0.43 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
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              Table 8 The impact of country-level and firm-level factors on Organisational Ethical Vulnerability 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ExCItE Variables           
REGQUA -0.0246*** -0.0248*** -0.0249***   -0.0160* -0.0245***   -0.0262*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00685) (0.00687)   (0.00859) (0.00680)   (0.00685) 
SIPI 0.0336 -0.00639 -0.000429 -0.0297 -0.0679 0.0334 0.156 -0.0105 0.0159 0.0342 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.100) (0.0990) (0.102) (0.102) (0.125) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
RULEOFLAW    -0.0202***     -0.0216**  
    (0.00677)     (0.0101)  
GOVEFFECT        -0.0287**   
 
LOGGDP 
     
-1.123*** 
(0.29) 
  (0.0117)   
OEI Variables           
BCT 0.380** 0.426*** 0.434*** 0.417*** 0.306* 0.384** 0.380** 0.383** 0.394**  
 (0.158) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.159) (0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.155)  
ECBI 0.0238 0.0605 -0.00170 0.0192 0.0453 0.0119 0.0174 -0.287 -0.234 0.0342 
 (0.223) (0.221) (0.223) (0.221) (0.224) (0.222) (0.222) (1.192) (1.030) (0.222) 
SKILL -0.00317 -0.00445 -0.00475* -0.00462* -0.00305 -0.00307 -0.00319 -0.00241 -0.00252 -0.00321 
 (0.00288) (0.00283) (0.00281) (0.00280) (0.00290) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00285) (0.00285) (0.00288) 
ICGFP Variables 
BSIZE 
 
0.0578** 
 
0.0558** 
 
0.0566** 
 
0.0604** 
 
0.0532** 
 
0.0573** 
 
0.0581** 
 
0.0580** 
 
0.0593** 
 
0.0583** 
 (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
NED -0.0113 -0.0107 -0.0103 -0.00917 -0.00898     -0.0113 
 (0.00692) (0.00687) (0.00685) (0.00681) (0.00697)     (0.00693) 
NBM 0.0410** 0.0390** 0.0358** 0.0323* 0.0465*** 0.0409** 0.0414** 0.0375** 0.0353** 0.0409** 
 (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
GD 0.0117 0.0110 0.0140* 0.0126* 0.0119 0.0116 0.0114 0.00960 0.00887 0.0118 
 (0.00759) (0.00757) (0.00752) (0.00747) (0.00760) (0.00760) (0.00757) (0.00751) (0.00749) (0.00760) 
DUAL 0.0920 0.0777 0.0924 0.152 0.173 0.0872 0.0908 0.0762 0.0793 0.0980 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.156) (0.155) (0.162) 
SBO -0.00896** -0.00886** -0.00871* -0.00887** -0.00872* -0.00872* -0.00888** -0.00766* -0.00802* -0.00875* 
 (0.00452) (0.00443) (0.00445) (0.00448) (0.00451) (0.00450) (0.00451) (0.00443) (0.00446) (0.00451) 
TSEC 0.839*** 0.914*** 1.018*** 0.910*** 0.998*** 0.833*** 0.841*** 0.788*** 0.712*** 0.830*** 
 (0.219) (0.218) (0.222) (0.213) (0.232) (0.218) (0.219) (0.215) (0.209) (0.219) 
ACI -0.000977 -0.00220 -0.00425 -0.00736 0.00169 -0.00179 -0.00153 -0.00599 -0.00826 -3.14e-05 
 (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0139) 
PW12 0.566***    0.581*** 0.564*** 0.565*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 0.573*** 
 (0.165)    (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) 
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PW13  0.318*         
  (0.172)         
LOSS   0.477* 0.457*       
   (0.254) (0.252)       
Control Variables           
LEVER -0.501 -0.455 -0.509 -0.400 -0.544 -0.507 -0.503 -0.451 -0.396 -0.505 
 (0.461) (0.458) (0.464) (0.458) (0.464) (0.461) (0.461) (0.458) (0.455) (0.460) 
MTBV 0.00902 0.00949 0.00846 0.00838 0.00920 0.00900 0.00899 0.00947 0.00874 0.00904 
 (0.00932) (0.00923) (0.00895) (0.00889) (0.00930) (0.00934) (0.00932) (0.00941) (0.00939) (0.00931) 
DUAL 0.0920 0.0777 0.0924 0.152 0.173 0.0872 0.0908 0.0762 0.0793 0.0980 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.156) (0.155) (0.162) 
Interaction variables           
NED*REGQUA      -0.000117     
      (7.93e-05)     
NED*SIPI       -0.00170    
       (0.00105)    
ECBI*GOVEFFEC        0.00316   
        (0.0137)   
ECBI*RULEOFLAW         0.00253  
         (0.0119)  
BCT*REGQUA          0.00409** 
          (0.00183) 
Constant -4.390** -4.434** -4.971*** -4.191** -1.804 -5.094*** -5.174*** -3.700** -3.727** -4.288** 
 (1.783) (1.773) (1.775) (1.776) (1.838) (1.802) (1.811) (1.806) (1.781) (1.792) 
Observations 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
Pseudo R2 0.1980 0.1817 0.1820 0.1731 0.2084 0.1970 0.1978 0.1903 0.1852 0.1965 
Table 8 reports results from the probit regression analysis. The dependent variable is Organisational Ethical Vulnerability (OEV) – it equals to 1 if a company has a scandal published in media linked to business 
ethics in general, political contributions or bribery and corruption, as defined in Table 2. The main sample includes 253 listed firms, whereas the control sample also includes 253 matched-pairs, from 28 different 
countries. In Model 1, financial performance is measured by using a dummy variable, PW12, which is equal to 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning in the year before the scandal, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 also 
includes two country-level governance mechanisms (regulation quality and strength of investor’s protection index). In Model 2, an alternative explanatory variable for financial performance is PW13, which is equal 
to 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning during the defect year – the year of corporate scandal. Model 3 includes another alternative measure for financial performance, measured by LOSS, which equals to 1 if a 
firm has reported losses during the defect year, and 0 otherwise. Model 4 includes World Bank indicator on rule of law and Model 5 includes the logarithm of per capita GDP. Model 6 includes interaction variable 
NED*REGQUAL, which is an interaction term between country-level governance (Regulation quality) and firm-level governance (NEDs). Model 7 includes NED*SIPI, measured by the interaction between 
country-level governance indicator (strength of investor protection index) and firm-level governance (NEDs). Model 8 includes country-level governance indicator on government effectiveness and the interaction 
variable (ECBI*GOVEFFEC) indicating the interaction between government effectiveness and firm-level commitment to business ethics (ECBI). Model 9 includes country-level indicator (rule of law) and interaction 
variable (ECBI*RULEOFLAW) representing the interaction between the quality of a country’s legal system and firm-specific explicit commitment to business ethics (ECBI). Model 10 includes BCT*REGQUAL, 
which represents the interaction between country-level regulation quality and the provision of firm-level bribery and corruption training programmes (BCT).
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Table 9 Robustness test with instrumental variables 
Variables IV-Probit Marginal effects 
   
BSIZE 0.226*** 0.0194 
 (0.0417)  
NEDs -0.0106 -0.00321 
 (0.00835)  
NBM 0.0382** 0.0131** 
 (0.0167)  
GD 0.00631 0.00386 
 (0.00728)  
DUAL 0.137 0.0301 
 (0.154)  
SBO -0.0127*** -0.00315 
 (0.00454)  
LOGTSEC    0.323*** 0.245 
 (0.08433)  
ACI -0.00510 -0.000176 
 (0.0122)  
BCT 0.166*** 0.137 
 (0.0617)  
ECBI 0.292 0.0152 
 (0.209)  
LEVER -0.236 -0.152 
 (0.388)  
PW12 0.487*** 0.190 
 (0.152)  
REGQUA -0.0118*** -0.00803 
 (0.00528)  
SKILL 0.00313 -0.000855 
 (0.00327)  
Constant -3.386**  
 (1.384)  
   
Observations 378  
Marginal effects are calculated for Model 1 using the partial derivative of outcome probability with respect to the difference variable, 
evaluated at the other difference variable means. Marginal effects measure the percentage of likelihood to engage in unethical activities. 
Endnotes 
1  The laws governing corporate behaviour such as anti-bribing legislation might have ethical motivation.  
2   https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/scandal  
3 Broadly, in corporate governance literature corporate reporting constitutes an important element that enhances 
transparency. We do not cover corporate reporting in this study; however, Chen and Roberts (2010) argue about the 
overlaps in these theories and discuss legitimacy and institutional theories in the corporate governance context, which is 
relevant to our search for factors that may explain organisational ethical vulnerability. 
4  The application of panel data was not an appropriate option in this investigation because the scandals were not repetitive 
in subsequent years and appropriate matched firms were also not available. Thus, by using a strict matching criterion, 
control firms were chosen from the same industry, country and of similar size. 
 
 
